Reminder Committee in Support of 6021 & General Committee meeting this Saturday, June 12 2021- 10am PST

http://www.disleague.com/ is fine and is firewalls up the yang, every time it is attacked, the backup auto reinstalls. 

 

Here is a memorandum for the upcoming mortgage foreclosure holding a prefix of what is going on, holding a federal question (pertaining to MERS) Memorandum copy

 

There is a prefix to explain the violations that bypassed the constitution and is meant t be removed for private understanding of what has been transpiring in the UD COURTS . The constitution is the only way forward so please share this out to our legal fighters.

 

In gratitude

/s/Faith Lynn Brashear

 

PREFIX

The purpose of this MEMORANDUM is to assist the DIRECTOR of these TRUST issues. Sharing law is not practicing law, it is up to the INTERESTED PARTIES involved to fully understand voluminous amounts artful pleading being used to defraud each other in these hypothecated subrogation’s that have caused these SLANDERS upon TITLE.

ATTESTATION OF COMMERCIAL TRUTHS IN DECLARATORY OUTLINE

As it is not “theory” that MERS MEMBER BANKS, FREDDIE MAC, and SERVICERS have been issuing 1099-A, therefor USC 26 61 (a) and 108/ 1122 AB (1) 1122 AB 10B 5 abandonment claims are the specific matters of law involved.

In accordance to the NATIONAL ARCHIVES FEDERAL REGISTER documents/2018/04/26/2018-08737 pertaining to the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Commerce, OMB 0651-0027 citing §1057. Certificates of registration (a) upon the principal register shall be issued in the name of the United States of America. MERS has been identified as the undisclosed “BORROWER” pledging individuals as ASSETS in usurpation to lend back the credit advance obtained against the full FUTURE VALUE individual’s performance (as disclosed upon the GOOD FAITH ESTIMATE.

The Depository Trust Company disclosed upon the REMIC prospectus for book-entry securities clearing are typically as follows; The Depository Trust Company in the U.S. or upon request through Clearstream, Luxembourg or Euroclear in Europe who were acting on or around the DEEDS OF TRUSTS inceptions to deliver certificates offered (per the prospectus supplement) to the “Trust” made through the book-entry facilities of The Depository Trust Company.

Meaning, in the MATTERS in which they conceived this SYSTEM, the discharged amount is taxable to the undisclosed BORROWER MERS – further it’s considered non-ordinary taxable income which raises a substantive question of how a 1098 interest “payor” became a 1099 gain on sale “payee.” This is called federalized tax evasion by monetizing certificates that in and of themselves hold no value, yet were pledged as collateral upon the signature of the individual for whom they proclaim is the GRANTOR in all caps upon Notices of Default, and the Grantor upon sale transfers in violation of 28 USC 1756 (1). In turn, the DOTS were used as “Instruments” to BORROW against the FULL FAITH and credit of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Often you will find that a NAMED “DEPOSITOR” was taking anywhere from 95%-100% of the certificate funds – they had the certificates offered against the manipulated LIBOR index, so they could control the payouts to the investors until they pull the short in the US HOUSING BOND MARKET. literally gambling with the FULL value of the GOOD FAITH ESTIMATE that “pooled” against your ability to repay what MERS – per the trademark – BORROWED by the hypnotization legal TITLE MERS registered in the NAME OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA – a tax exempt ENTITY.

“Registrations” under 27 USC §7011 Parts19, 22, 25, 70, 194, 270, 285, 290 and 26 CFR Parallel Authorities 7025 Part 197 “revenue laws” are therefore defined as commercial crimes. Without proper administration, such that is stated in §7001 no 1099A or 1099C could have ensued without, at the very least, a signed partnership agreement or a POA (means by their own codes, the IRS is an illegal “ENTITY” who have been getting off on playing god with the “FUTURE/s/ of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA”

BRIEF HISTORY

This revolves around a bonus depreciation provision that President George W. Bush signed into law in 2002 allowed taxpayers to immediately deduct 30% of the cost of new assets acquired during the provision’s applicability; the remaining 70% would be deducted under otherwise applicable MACRS rules.

Both the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, signed by President Bush, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, signed by President Obama, instituted a 50% bonus depreciation allowance. Later, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Compensation Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010 further increased the allowance to 100% – such that the asset would be fully depreciated in the year of acquisition.

After that came the Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010 further increased the allowance to 100% – such that the asset would be fully depreciated in the year of acquisition.

This meant that that the lending industry was allowed to buy a worthless sub prime loans and get a 100 percent tax credit by cancelling it, Day one under 26 US Code Section 61 (a) (1) Cancellation of debt and conversion to income paid on a tax payer form 1099.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTS UNDER PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS

(a) The Copyright Act of 1790, March 9
(b) 1933 House Joint Resolution No. 192-10 (c) 1935 The SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION codified U.S.C. §901stemming from the CESTUI QUE VIA Act of 1666 (d) Executive Order 10422 (e) Treasury Delegation Order No. 91
(f) Public Law 94-564, Legislative History, pg.5967, 1998
(g) The State Street Bank&Trust Co.v.Signature Financial Group, Inc.
(h) 2001 revision to UCC-9 allowed secured transactions could be collateralized, for Re-hypothecated selling and reselling of the Patent Copyright Trademark [not in the ordinary course of business effectively turning court judges into “Administrators of Royalties”.

FEDERAL QUESTION BEFORE THE COURTS

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1,3,5,6,18…”MATTERS of national security cannot tolerate any blind spots”

The Federal question is simply this…

When did it become permissible to allow a NA BANKING MEMBER “BORROWER” to influence congress so far beyond these provisional scopes as to pass such laws for the credit the US to be hypothecated by utilizing citizens as congressional co-signers in congress stead (cl.2)? See Nos. 19-715, 19-760.

ADDRESSING THE THIRD PARTY INCIDENTAL TRUSTEE’s

It would appear the foreclosing AGENTS are coming forward on behalf of a TRUSTEE’s acting under COLOR OF OFFICE: Pretense of official right to do an act, made by one who has no such right. Kiker v Pinson, 120 Ga. App. 784, 172, S.E.2d 333,334. An act under color of office is an act of an officer who claims authority to do the act by reason of his office when the office does not confer on him any such authority. Maryland Cas. Co. v. McCormack, Ky., 488 S.W. 2d 347, 352.

However, the NOTICES only reference the trustee upon the DEED OF TRUST, and not the TRUSTEE referenced upon the PROSPECTUS of a GRANTOR PASS THROUGH REAL ESTATE MRTGAGE INVESTMENT CONDUIT (herein REMIC). In many cases the TRUSTEE DEED OF SALE recorded after the FORCLOSURE have a zero-documentary transfer tax, this is because they already depreciated the value of the PROPERTY to zero. The “RECONSISTUTION” of the sale as accessories after the fact evidence DOUBLE DIPPING for a secondary write off based upon the projected performance of the pledged COLLATORAL that was USURPED.

FOR THE TRUST DIRECTOR
NOTICE OF PRESENTMENT OF AN EXPRESSED AFFIDAVIT

All corporate government is based upon Commercial Affidavits, Commercial Contracts, Commercial Liens and Commercial Distresses; hence, governments cannot exercise the power to expunge commercial processes. Commercial administration adjustments are called for Under 1.1-1 implementing regulation pursuant to subtitle F. Procedure administration for C – D subtitle A Income Tax Subtitle B. Estate and Gift tax Subtitle C Employment Tax D Excise tax afforded by 301. 601.

These courts know, or should know UCC §1-201 (4) without the proper registration or filings. BANKS can only lend credit to other BANKS, therefore if a partnership existed for which a 1099-A (abandonment of partnership interests) is filed, then if falls to the acting “Trustee” to supply the proper tax forms evidencing the existence of an actual BANKING PARTER as the DEED OF TRUST does not evidence a lien ON record, only a dual tracked lien OF record. In short, these pretender “TRUSTEE” failed to comply under IRC 26 USC Sec §1250 and §1245 recapture rules and disallowance.

Meaning because of their failure to address determination under Treasury Regulations Sec. 1.1502-21(b)(2)(iv), SRLY Regulations Sec. 1.1502-15(g) or Regulation. Sec. 1.1502-21(b)(g) rendering a filing of subsequent incomplete returns based upon false information, they now become liable for the what is prima facia evidence of an INVOLUNTARY CONVERGENCE TO INCOME which occurred upon inception of the DOT. Further because they are coming forward under a tax exempt “Special Purpose Vehicle” on behalf of the REMIC it calls into question the tax-exempt value of the entire REMIC itself.

These are just not instruments laden with blatant ULTRA VIRES frauds being submitted to these courts (i.e. manipulation of LIBOR, forged signatures, fraudulent documents) these are “instruments” of financial warfare forever burned into history as the GREAT MORTGAGE CRISIS.

Addressing the UNIVERSAL COMMERCIAL CODES by AMICUS under UCC 3-419 for Claim Adjustor. In re: [Custodial Partnership] COLLATERAL AGENTS addressed under TWEA 40 Stat. 411, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 95 and 50 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq”.
for violations of the 80th Articles of war. UCC : 2020-187-7359-8 : 2020-276-0666-5 : 2020-281-1770-2 : 2020-286-2905-2 (Regs. Sec. 1.1502-28(a)(2)). SRLY that are not subject to the SRLY (Regs. Sec. 1.1502 28(a)(3)). RCFC 83.1 (d) 502,118,134,213,226,312,528 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1510

Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1961(4), defines an enterprise as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” This now becomes a witnessed unrebutted affidavit presentment which falls under UCC 5-§108 which are drawn on accounts receivable held in the United States Treasury for use to satisfy and discharge the debt in the FORM of an AWARD LETTER for credit past due as outlined upon the DEED OF TRUST evidencing the involuntary convergence to income upon inception. “Registrations” under 27 USC §7011 Parts19, 22, 25, 70, 194, 270, 285, 290 and 26 CFR Parallel Authorities 7025 Part 197 “revenue laws” are therefore defined as commercial crimes. Without proper administration, such that is stated in §7001 no 1099A or 1099C could have ensued without, at the very least, a signed partnership agreement or a POA.

Unilateral contracts of conveyance that were tendered upon inception were settled in the issuance of HUD ONE settlement statements as a Bill of Sale. Meaning at all times improper presentments to the United States Treasury were made by the “ACTING TRUSTEE”.

Case Law Supplement

American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442, (1950):
“It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into error.”

Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500 (1960): “It is to be noted that the statute differentiates between States of the United States and foreign states by the use of a capital S for the word when applied to a State of the United States.”

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE §54950: “The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.” [Emphasis added]. “The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know…”

NOTE: *63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, §247* “As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. [1] Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts. [3] and owes a fiduciary duty to the public. [4] It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual. [5] Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official who tends to weaken public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual rights is against public policy. Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit-and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears [483 U.S. 372] in the statute. See United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir1985) includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, and if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. McNally v United States 483 U.S. 350 (1987) [Emphasis added].

Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & Omaha Ry. Co.,151 U.S. 1, 3 (1894): “…it was said ‘that wherever a man does an act which in law and in fact is a wrongful act, and such an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury to another, and which in the particular case does produce such an injury, an action on the case will lie.”

FRAUD: An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.

Title 18, Section §1346. “For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. [Emphasis added].
COLOR OF LAW: The appearance or semblance, without the substance, of legal right. Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state, is action taken under color of law. Atkins v. Lanning, D.C. Okl. 415, F. Supp. 186, 188. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. pg. 241, (1979)].

Internal Revenue Code §860D(a)(4) must be transferred within three months or 90 days; (4) Trust (ie. REMIC ,as defined in Title 26,Subtitle A Chapter 1, Subchapter M, Part II§§ 850-862) and The certificate-holders cannot hold the note or DOT: (i.e. REMIC as defined in Title 26, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter M, Part II 850 § § -862) cannot hold assets, for if it does , its tax exempt status is violated and the Trust itself is VOID Ab initio. Lawyers may argue they can transfer after but this is only a qualified loan to replace a defective mortgage and only up to a year.

IRC, NY Trust laws and SEC law, and UCC 9: 2013 New York Consolidated Laws; EPT – Estates, Powers & Trusts Article 7 – TRUSTS ; Part 2 – (7-2.1 – 7-2.8) RULES GOVERNING TRUSTEES Act of trustee in contravention of trust; Universal Citation: NY Est Pow & Trusts L § 7-2.4 (2012). Act of trustee in contravention of trust If the trust is expressed in the instrument creating the estate of the trustee, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustee in contravention of the trust, except as authorized by this article and by any other provision of law, is void.

NOTE: Unsigned requests for payment are invalid under California’s Statute of Frauds, found at California Civil Code § 1624.

Federal Crop Insurance v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947): “Anyone entering into an arrangement with the government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the government stays within the bounds of his authority, even though the agent himself may be unaware of the limitations upon his authority.”

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,239: “The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions” [Presumption of law, is not law].

Vladis v. Kline 412 US 441, 449 (1973); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. La Fleur, 414 US 632, 639, 640 (1974): “A conclusive presumption may be defeated where its application would impair a party’s constitutionally-protected liberty or property interests”.

Roberts v. Del Monte Properties Co., 111 Cal.App.2d 69, 243 P.2d 914 (Cal. App. 1 Dist., 1952): “…if the evidence is clear, positive, un-contradicted and of such a nature that it cannot rationally be disbelieved the court must instruct that a fact so proved has been established as a matter of law. Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 457, 461, 126 P.2d 868.”

Frost &Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of California, 271 U.S. 583:
“It has been long established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution”.

Norton v. Shelby County 118 U.S. 425: “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties…”.

In the United States, sovereignty resides in the people who act through the organs [Emphasis added] established by the Constitution. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 471, 1 L. Ed. 440; Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 Dall. 54, 93, 1 L.Ed. 507; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404, 405, 4 L Ed. 579; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220. The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).

Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L. Ed 2d 619, 91 S.Ct.1999 (1970): “When a government agent acts in an unconstitutional manner, the agent becomes personally liable for damages”.

COLOR OF OFFICE: Pretense of official right to do an act, made by one who has no such right. Kiker v Pinson, 120 Ga. App. 784, 172, S.E.2d 333,334. An act under color of office is an act of an officer who claims authority to do the act by reason of his office when the office does not confer on him any such authority. Maryland Cas. Co. v. McCormack, Ky., 488 S.W. 2d 347, 352.

Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2nd 1378, 9th Cir., (1981): “Persons dealing with the government are charged with knowing government statutes and regulations and they assume the risk that government agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation”.

City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944 (Tex. App. – Dallas [5th Dist.], 1922):
“The rights of the individual are not derived from governmental agencies, either municipal, state or federal, or even from the Constitution. They exist inherently in every man, by endowment of the Creator, and are merely reaffirmed in the Constitution, and restricted only to the extent that they have been voluntarily surrendered by the citizenship to the agencies of government. The people’s rights are not derived from the government, but the government’s authority comes from the people.”

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 383 (1819): “…the authority of legislation in the state government is not unlimited; there are several limitations to their legislative authority. First, from the nature of all government, especially, of republican government, in which the residuary powers of sovereignty, not granted specifically, by inevitable implication, are reserved to the people. Secondly, from the express limitations contained in the state constitutions. And thirdly, from the express prohibitions to the states contained in the United States constitution”.

The Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company v. Henry Debolt, Treasurer of Hamilton County, 57 U.S. 416, 16 How. 416, 14 L.Ed. 997 (1853): “the people of the several States are absolutely and unconditionally sovereign within their respective territories”

Frost v. Railroad Commission of State of California, 271 U.S. 583, 46 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926) [Emphasis added]: “It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not (Page 594) unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence”.

Laird v. Tatum 8212 288, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972):
“The Constitution was designed to keep government off the backs of the people. The Bill of Rights was added to keep the precincts of belief and expression…”.

U.S. Constitution, 9th amendment: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

Article 1 Section 8 Clause 17 in the Constitution, Title 4 USC §72 Public Offices at the seat of Government: “All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.” [Emphasis added] [The only expressed exception is found in Title 48 USC §1612(a) Jurisdiction of District Court in the U.S. Virgin Islands, without any reference to the 50 states].

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 426 (1819): “This great principle that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them. From this, which may be almost termed an axiom, other propositions are deduced as corollaries… 1st. That a power to create implies a power to preserve: 2d. That a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with these powers to create and to preserve: 3d. That where this repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over which it is supreme”.

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528: “The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings”.

There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, see, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70—71, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464—465, 86 L. Ed. 680, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).

United States v. Minker, 350 U.S.179(1956): “Where administrative action may result in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living, any doubt as to the extent of power delegated to administrative officials is to be resolved in citizen’s favor, and court must be especially sensitive to the citizen’s rights where proceeding is non-judicial”.

Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 81 L.Ed. 1307, 57 S.Ct. 904: “Social Security is not insurance at all but merely welfare”.

California Civil Code, Section 1589: “A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person accepting” [Indoctrination is not education].

United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); [Emphasis added]: “… railroad benefits, like social security benefits, are not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at any time”.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires an evidentiary hearing before a recipient of certain government welfare benefits can be deprived of such benefit.

Economy Plumbing and Heating Co. v. US, 470 F. 2d 585 (1972) [Emphasis added]: “No procedure is prescribed for non-taxpayers and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them [non-taxpayers] Congress does not assume to deal, and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of the revenue laws”….
“Revenue Laws relate to taxpayers, and not to non-taxpayers.” NOTE: Registrations under 27 USC §7011 Parts19, 22, 25, 70, 194, 270, 285, 290 and 26 CFR Parallel Authorities 7025 Part 197 “revenue laws” are defined as commercial crimes.

U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (1977): “Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading… We cannot condone this shocking conduct…If that is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected immediately”.

Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent Justice Co., 111 U.S. 746, 4 S.Ct. 652, 28 L.Ed. 585.” [Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, pg 645, (1979)]: “The constitutional right of men to pursue their “happiness”. [This means the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase their prosperity, or develop their faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment].

The Antelope, 23 U.S.66; 10 Wheat 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825): “Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor… and no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will…”.

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 166, 47 S.Ct. 319, 326, 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927), quoting McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 482, 2 N.E. 615, 626 (1885): “That the power may be abused, is no ground for denying its existence. It is a limited power, and should be kept within its proper bounds; and, when these are exceeded, a jurisdictional question is presented which is cognizable in courts”.

Justice Street Improv Co. v. Pearson, 181 C 640, 185 P.(1962); O’Neil v. Dept. of Professional & Vocational Standards, 7 CA2d 393, 46 P2d 234 [Emphasis added]: “Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of administrative agencies and where jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied, the action of the agency is a nullity…”

F & S Contr. Co. v. Jensen, 337 F.2d 160, 161-162, (10th Cir.1963): “[I]t is now settled that when there is an issue as to the sufficiency of jurisdictional amount, the burden of providing jurisdiction is on the party asserting it. Justice of Lauden, Okla. v. Chapman, 257 F.2d 601 (10th Cir.); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135.

California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1897 [Emphasis added]: The organic law is the Constitution of Government, and is altogether written. Other written laws are denominated statutes. The written law of this State is therefore contained in its Constitution and statutes, and in the Constitution and statutes of the United States.

18 USC Sec. 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law: Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491: “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them”.

Hall v. State, 933 S.W.2d 363, 326 Ark. 318. [Emphasis added]: “Policy never becomes law no matter how well used or well accepted. Policy never gains legal authority by usage”.

Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters 657. [Without consent, no jurisdiction can be granted]:
“We know of no case in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B. without his consent has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative power in any state in the Union. On the contrary, it has been constantly resisted as inconsistent with just principles by every judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced”.

5 USC 552a: “The purpose of the Act is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against invasion of personal privacy…to permit an individual to determine what records pertaining to him are collected, maintained, used, or disseminated by such agencies.”

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43. [Emphasis added]: “The individual … owes no duty to the state … since he receives nothing there-from, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state,… He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights”.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894) [Emphasis added]: [As stated by Mr. Justice Field in Re Pacific Ry. Commission, 32 Fed. 241, 250,] “of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half their value”.

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190. “Neither branch of the legislative department , still less any merely administrative body, established by congress, possesses, or can be invested with, a general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen. We said in Boyd v. U.S., 116 U. S. 616, 630, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, and it cannot be too often repeated, that the principles that embody the essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions on the part of government and it’s employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of his life”.

People v. Ortiz, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 292, fn. 2, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 59: “A statute does not trump the Constitution”.

U.S. CONSTITUTION Article XIII: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 2) CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS SEC. 6. Slavery is prohibited. Involuntary servitude is prohibited except to punish crime.

The Hobbs Act defines “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right”. 18 USC §1951(b)(2).

NOTE: In adopting its rules and regulations, an administrative agency must act within the Constitution. (Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 256, 53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265.) Obviously, administrative agencies, like police officers (People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 437, 282 P.2d 905, (former Pen. Code, § 653h ‘could’ not authorize violations of the Constitution)), must obey the Constitution and may not deprive persons of constitutional rights.

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936): “It is no longer open to question that the general government … possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation”.

U.S. v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984): “A practice condemned by the Constitution cannot be saved by historical acceptance and present convenience”.

Hurtado v. People of the State of California, 110 U.S. 516: “The state cannot diminish rights of the people”.

People v. Reber, 223 Cal.Rptr. 139, 177 Cal.App.3d 523 (Cal. App. 3 Dist., 1986):
“…the constitutional confrontation clause has been held to prevail over a statutory privilege”. See People v. Di Maso, supra, 55 Ill.Dec. 650, 426 N.E.2d at p. 975; State v. Storlazzi (Conn.1983) 191 Conn. 453, 464 A.2d 829, 833.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Sheriff, etc, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220: “For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.” . . .” This principle of interpretation has been sanctioned by this court in Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Chy Luny v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370; and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730″.

Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & Omaha Ry. Co., 151 U.S. 1, 3 (1894): “…it was said ‘that wherever a man does an act which in law and in fact is a wrongful act, and such an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury to another, and which in the particular case does produce such an injury, an action on the case will lie”.

18 USC Sec. 241. Conspiracy against rights: “If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same…. they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.”

5 USC §556(d): “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of the rule or order has the burden of proof… A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence… A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts” (Emphasis added).

Clark v. Stotts, 127 Cal.App.2d 589[key]: “[4] The burden of proving all of the essential elements thereof is upon the person so relying, and if one element is wanting, then the claim must fail. (Yuba River Sand Co. v. Justice of Marysville, 78 Cal.App.2d 421, 429 [177 P.2d 642]; Sheehan v. All Persons, 80 Cal.App. 393, 401 [252 P. 337].) [Emphasis added].

Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 70, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992):
“Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim’s ‘dominant’ character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn”.

Larson v. Domestic Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L. Ed. 1628 (1949) [Emphasis added]: “…where the officer’s powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign has forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his authority and therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is important to note (Page 690) that in such cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer’s lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient. (Page 692) The respondent’s contention, which the Court of Appeals sustained, was that there exists a third category of cases in which the action of a Government official may be restrained or directed. If, says the respondent, an officer of the Government wrongly takes or holds specific property to which the plaintiff has title then his taking or holding is a tort, and ‘illegal’ as a matter of general law, whether or not it be within his delegated powers. He may therefore be sued individually to prevent the ‘illegal’ taking or to recover the property ‘illegally’ held.”

West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnett, 319 US 624, 638 (1943): “One’s right to life, liberty and property … and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”

Walz v. Tax Commission of New York Justice, 397 U.S. 664 at 678 (1970):
“It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it”.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 361 (1819): “The 6th article of the constitution of the United States declares, that the laws made in pursuance of it, ‘shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution, or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.’ By this declaration, the states are prohibited from passing any acts which shall be repugnant to a law of the United States”.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Dicti libelli
Constitutional Issues
Article I, Section 10 of the United State Constitution allows you to Contract as long as you do not infringe on life, liberty or property………………………………reputaret verum
4th Amendment- prohibits unreasonable seizure of any person, person’s home (including its curtilage) or personal property without a warrant, wrongful foreclosures are illegal seizures of property ………..…………………………………………………….. reputaret verum

5th Amendment – Federal Government not deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or property,” without due process of the law…………………………………….…… reputaret verum

7th Amendment -In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law……………………………………………………..… reputaret verum

9th Amendment The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people…….……reputaret verum

10th Amendment The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people……………………………………………………………..… reputaret verum

13th Amendment Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction……………………… reputaret verum

14th Amendment – explicitly prohibits states from violating an individual’s rights of due process………………………..……………………………………..… reputaret verum

Article XIV (Amendment 14 – Rights Guaranteed: Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process, and Equal Protection AKA The Declaration of Rights of 1689…………………………………………………………………… reputaret verum

The Privileges and Immunities Clause (U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1, also known as the Comity Clause) prevents a state from treating citizens of other states in a discriminatory manner…………………………………….. reputaret verum

Pursuant to 5 Stat. 516, Chapter 188, § 5 enacted August 23, 1842. pursuant to the Act of September 24, 1789, Chapter 20: and The Constitution for the United States of America Article III § 2……………………………………………… reputaret verum

The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”).[3] The submission of false evidence to a court is governed by Rule 3.3. and Rule 11…………….……………………………………………………………………passim

42 U.S. Code § 12202 State immunity Current through Pub. L.114-38 See Public Laws for the current Congress (Pub. L. 101–336,.title V, § 502, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 370)…………………………………………………………………..… reputaret verum

Supplemental Rules (B)(1), (c)(2) & (E)(4)(f) or in the alternative…….. reputaret verum
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 26, 37 or 56……………………………………… reputaret verum
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(h) ………………………….. reputaret verum
F.R.C.P. 17 ………………… originale in ea creditorem esse veluti beneficiarios
FRCPA Rule 52(a) ……………………………………………… reputaret verum
(SFRCP) Rule (E)8 ……………………………………………… reputaret verum
SFRCP (B)3(b), ……………………………………………….. reputaret verum
12 CFR 27.1.……………………………………………………. reputaret verum

The Smith Act……………………………………………….… reputaret verum
18 U.S.C Sec. 153…………………………………………….… reputaret verum
18 U.S.C. § 242……………………………………………….… reputaret verum
18 USC §§ 2, 3, 4, 113(b), 219, 241, 242, 371,654, 661, 709, 951,
1001, 1028, 1341, 1581, 1621, 1622, 1961, 2111, 2382……………….… passim
Title 18 – U.S. Code § 115………………………………………. reputaret verum
18 U.S. Code § 2381…………………………………………….. reputaret verum
18 U.S. Code § 2382…………………………………………….. reputaret verum
18 U.S. Code § 2383…………………………………………….. reputaret verum
18 U.S. Code § 2384…………………………………………….. reputaret verum
18 U.S. Code § 2385……………………………………………. reputaret verum

18 U.S. Code § 242 and under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c) in accordance
with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Tafflin v Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990). ………………………………….…passim
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, per 17 CFR 240.12g-4 (b) …………………………………………………… reputaret verum
Sec 112 (2) of the Dodd Frank………………………………….. reputaret verum
The Internal Affairs Doctrine…………………………………………………passim
Treasury Regulation 1.856-6 et seq. ………………………………………passim

Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Publication 542 Corporations…………………………………………………………..… reputaret verum
Rudders Section [6:566] Contracts void………………………… reputaret verum
REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE 23301………………….. reputaret verum
Rev.&Tax.C. 23304.1(a) ……………………………………..… reputaret verum
IRS Bulletin 544 Installment sale in re: 1122 AB……………… reputaret verum
IRS forms 1040, 8300, 1120, 1066, 7004, 1099 OID, 1031 Exchange;
or 4490 , 8594………..…………………………………….…passim laventur
Title 22 USC Foreign Relations and Intercourse- International Organizations Chapter 7 § 286g. …………………………………………..………. reputaret verum
22 USCA 286 et seq. ……………………………………..………… reputaret verum
Title 24 Part 27 Subpart B……………………………..……… reputaret verum
Title 24 USC 1.1-1………………………….…………..………reputaret verum
26 U.S. Code §61 (a) (1) …………………………………….. reputaret verum
26 U.S. Code §108 …………………………………………… reputaret verum
26 U.S. Code §453 (7) …………………………………………reputaret verum
26 U.S. Code §673 ……………………………………………..reputaret verum
26 U.S. Code § 856……………………………………………. reputaret verum
26 U.S. Code § 860……………………………………………..reputaret verum
26 U.S. Code §1033……………………………………………..reputaret verum
26 U.S. Code § 1445…………………………………………….reputaret verum
28 U.S. Code §1333……………………………………………..reputaret verum
28 U.S. Code §1508……………………………………………. reputaret verum 28 U.S. Code §2461……………………………………………. reputaret verum
28 U.S. Code §2463……………………………………………. reputaret verum
28 U.S. Code §3002(15(A)(B)(C), …………………………….. reputaret verum
Title 36 U.S. Code Chapter 705 – THE FOUNDATION OF THE FEDERAL
BAR ASSOCIATION, Code § 70503 (c)……………… reputaret verum
42 U.S. Code §1983………………………………………….… reputaret verum
42 U.S. Code §1985….…………………………………………. reputaret verum
42 U.S. Code § 12203 – Prohibition against retaliation and coercion.
5-123 California Real Estate Law & Practice § 123.01 ……… lex implicata
46 U.S. Code Chapter 311……………………………………….reputaret verum
Pen. Code §126……………………………………………….… lex implicata
Pen. Code §125…………………………………………………. lex implicata

IN ACCEPTANCE OF OATHS
Cannon 3 – Rule 3.11 (B)(2)(B)(4)…………………… ad tenendum juramento

Cannon 3 – Rule 3.5 …………………………………. ad tenendum juramento
Cannon 3 – Rule 3.13 (A) ……….…………..…… ad tenendum juramento
Cannon 3(B) ………………………….……………… ad tenendum juramento

California rules of Professional conduct Rule ………….…..…… honoratus
California Rules of Court Rule 8.220 (a) ………………………… honoratus
Rule 11………………………………………………………………… honoratus
Rule 12 (c) ……………………..……………………………… fluctuationem iusto
Supplemental Rules of 31…………………………..…………….……… dissipatae
Rule B……………………………………………………………………………… dissipatae
Rule E. …………………………………………………………………………….. dissipatae

California Statutes
CALIFORNIA CODE 2113………………….……………………………. dissipatae
California Corporation Code 2112, 2113, 2114, 2116, 2257………..……. dissipatae
Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(d)……………………………………….. dissipatae
Cal Civ Code § 2924 et al ……………………………………..dissipatae
Cal. Evid. Code § 225…………………………………………… dissipatae

CASE REFERNCES
Corwin v. Los Angels Newspaper Serv. Bureau, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 842,851 fn. 6.)……………………………………………. recensuit
HELEN GALOPE, an individual, Petitioner – Appealla
V Deutsche Bank National Trust Company….…………..… recensuit
Edgar v MITE Corp (1982) 457 US 624, 645;…………………… recensuit Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of Calif., Inc. (2007) 153 CA4th 659, 669, 63 CR3d 537, 545].………………… recensuit
Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 214 Cal. App. 4th 1047 (2013)…………………………………………………….… recensuit
People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980)…..…. recensuit
Trinsey v. Pagliaro, D.C. Pa.\1964, 229 F. Supp……………….. recensuit
The Huntress, 12 Fed. Case 984 @ 992 & 989, (Case No. 6,914) (D.Me. 1840)……………………………………………………………. recensuit
United States v. Lovasco (06/09/77) 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752,…………………………………………………… recensuit
WINEMAN v. GASTRELL 53 F. 697 Dec 12, 1892……………… recensuit

Ad auxilium dicti libelli review
15 USC 1640 et al 15 USC § 1640(a), 2006
15 USC 1637(a) 15 USC 1637(b)
15 USC 1638(a) 15 USC 1639
15 USC § 57a, Section 18, FTC Act
16 CFR §§ 1.98(d) 16 CFR §§ 1.98(e)
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) 28 U.S.C. §1746
Section 32 of Regulation Z
TILA § 129(1)(2)
HOEPA Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
UDAAP Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices
Title 16, Ch. I, Sub A, Part 1, Sub L § 1.98
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a)
Title VI, § 626(b)(D)

Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2000) § 10:1, p. 25
Elmore (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal. 2014) 94 B.R. 670, 676 PUB. L. 111–8, 3/11/09, Omnibus Appropriations Act, Division D,
Pub. L. 111-203, 7/21/10, Omnibus Appropriations Act Sub F, 1472 § 129E(k)
5 U.S.C. § 552. As Amended By Public Law No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 § 552

F.R.B.P
F.R.B.P. 3001(c)(1) F.R.B.P. 3001(c)(2) F.R.B.P. 3001(c) (2) (D)(i)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(a)

C.C.
Civil Code section 1646 Cal Civ Code § 2923.55
Civil Code section 2924 (a) (1) Civil Code section 2924(a)(6)
Cal Civ Code §2941.9 (d) Cal Civ Code §§·2939-2941
CCP § 529, et al

U.C.C
UCC § 3-301(i) UCC § 3-301(ii)
UCC § 3-305 et al UCC § 3-305(b)(1)(ii)(iii
UCC § 3-309 UCC § 3-309(a)(ii)
UCC § 3-309(a)(1) UCC § 3-309(a)(2)
UCC § 3-309(a)(3) UCC § 3-309(b)
UCC § 3-418(d)

Federal Reviews recensuit
Schwartz, Demythologizing The Grand Jury, 10 American
Criminal Law Review 701, 759 (1972); see also p. 758, n. 291…..in passim

Federal Cases recensuit
Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank. Supra, 885, F. Supp. 2d at p. 972….
Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services, 708 F.3d 282, 290 (1st Cir. 2013)
Ohlendorf v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, 279 F.R.D. 575, 583 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
FHFA /FNMAE vs Deutsch bank
Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. ruleSav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699 704-05 (9th Cir. 1986)
Smith v.Wells Fargo Credit Corp.,713FSupp.354(D. Ariz.1989)
Case Studies Ad auxilium dicti libelli review
American Textile Mfrs. Institute v. The Limited, 190 F.3d 729, 738-739 (6th Cir. 1999)
Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000)
Anderson v. Hear Federal Sav & Loan Assn (1989) 208 Cal. App 3d 202, 211
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1668 (1964)
Belgard v. State of Hawaii,883 F.Supp.510,514(D.Hawaii1995)
Bivens v.Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
Blair v. United States, 39 S.Ct. 468, 471 (1919)
Bank of America v. Greenleaf MERS
Bains V. Metropolitan Mortgage Nos. 86206–1, 86207–9
Cabell Huntington Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984, 986 (4th Cir. 1996)
Campaign v. Barba, 23 AD3d 327 (2nd Dept. 2005)
Castillo v. Skoba, Vice President of Aurora Loan Services, LLC2010 WL 3986953 (N.D.Cal., November 30, 2010)
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194 (1917
Chavez v. IndyMac Mortgage Services (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1062
Cleveland v Johnson (2012) 209 CA4th 1315, 1338, citing Herbert v Lankershim (1937) 9C2d 409, 483)
Cook v. Smith, 834 P.2d 418, 420-21 (N.M. 1992)
Costello v. United States, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408 (1956)
Davis v. Passman
e.g., Bank of Am. V. La Jolla Group II (2005) 129 Cal. App. 4th 706,712
Ex Parte Grossman, 45 S.Ct. 332, 333 (1925)
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Press Publishing Association, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982)
Fast v. School Dist. Of City of Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
Glaski v. Bank of America, 218 Cal.App.4th1079 (2013)
Hale v. Henkel, 26 S.Ct. 370, 373 (1906)
Haines v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-421
Harkey V. US Bank Et Al. Case No. 2:14-cv-00177-RFB-GWF
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2687 (1991)
Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 196 Cal.App.4th 1366 (2011)
Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 216 Cal.Ap.4th497 (2013)
Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc 729 F. 3d 1092
Kemp v Countrywide Case 08-02448-JHW Doc 25
Kirby v. US Lumber
Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 933 (7th Cir. 1973)
Lewis v. The Board of Commissioners of Wake Co., 74 N.C. 194, 197-199 (Superior Court of Wake County, 1876
Linder v. United States, 45 S.Ct. 446 (1925)
Lona v Citibank, N.A. (2011) Cal.App.4th 89,112.)
Macki n v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886)
McCarthy v. Manson 554 F.Supp. 1275, 1279 (D. Conn. 1982)
McDonald v. Smith, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 2789 (1985)
Myers v. United States. 47 S.Ct. 21, 37 (1926)
Munger v. Moore, 11 Cal.App.4th1 (1970)
Naranjo v. SBMC Mortgage,(S.D. Cal. 2012)2012 WL 3030370..in support Ord v. McKee,(1855) 5 Cal. 515
Nguyen v. Chase Bank No. 5:2012cv04183 – Document 50 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 81 6S.Ct. at 530-531
People of the State of California v. COUNTRYWIDE Financial Corporations, et al Stipulated Judgment and Injunction Complaint No. LC083076, Superior Court of the State of California, County of LA, Northwest District (2008)
Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1250 (2012)
Platsky v. C.I.A. 953 F.2d. 25
Sir John Hawles, Remarks on Colledge’s Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 724 (1681)
StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court(1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 976 P.2d 214
Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 150, 160 (3rd Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)
Trucking Unlimited, 92 S.Ct. at 611-612
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578 (1975)
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561(1974)
United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977)
United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 899 (3rd Cir. 1981)
United States v. Deisch, 20 F.3d 139, 145 n. 11 (5th Cir.1994)
United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765 (D.C.W.D.N.C. 1883)
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 573, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976)
United States v. Singer,660 F.2d 1295,1302 n.14(8th Cir.1981)
United States v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 163 F. 66, 75 (C.Ct.M.D. Tenn. 1908)
United States v. Williams, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1744 (1992). In Re Grand Jury Application, 617 F.Supp. 199, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
United Transp. Union v. I.C.C., 891 F.2d 908, 915-916 (D.C. App. 1989)
Whitehouse v. United States District Court For District of Rhode Island, 53 F.3d 1349, 1357 (1st Cir. 1995)
Velarde-Villarreal v. United States, 354 F.2d 9 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1965)
In re Subpoened Grand Jury Witness, 171 F.3d 511, 513(7th Cir. 1999)
Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 901 (5th Cir. 1995)
Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corporation,(2014) 226

HISTORICAL CASE CITATIONS Ad auxilium dicti libelli review

“An attorney for the plaintiff cannot admit evidence into the court. He is either an attorney or a witness”. (Trinsey v. Pagliaro D.C.Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647). Trinsey v Pagliaro D.C.Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647. “Statements of counsel in brief or in argument are not facts before the court and are therefore insufficient for a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.” The motion to dismiss a case is only argued by the opposing attorney, who is not allowed to testify on the facts of the case, therefore the motion to dismiss is never argued by the real party in interest.

HISTORICAL CASE CITATIONS Ad auxilium dicti libelli review

Holt v. United States, (10/31/10) 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct.2, “Factual statements or documents appearing only in briefs shall not be deemed to be a part of the record in the case, unless specifically permitted by the Court” – Oklahoma Court Rules and Procedure, Federal local rule 7.1(h). “Manifestly, [such statements] cannot be properly considered by us in the disposition of [a] case.” United States v. Lovasco (06/09/77) 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752. “Under no possible view, however, of the findings they were considering can they be held to constitute a compliance with the statute, since they merely embody conflicting statements of counsel concerning the facts as they suppose them to be andir appreciation of the law which they deem applicable, there being, therefore, no attempt whatever to state the ultimate facts by a consideration of which we would be able to conclude whether or not the judgment was warranted.” Gonzales v. Buist. (04/01/12) 224 U.S. 126, 56 L. Ed. 693, 32 S. Ct. 463.
The United States Code, Title 12, Section 24, Paragraph 7 confers upon a bank the power to lend its money, not it’s credit. In First National Bank of Tallapoosa vs. Monroe, 135 Ga 614; 69 S.E. 1123 (1911), the court, after citing the statue heretofore said, “The provisions referred to do not give power to a national bank to guarantee the payment of the obligations of others solely for their benefit, nor is there any authority to issue them through such power incidental of the business of banking. A bank can lend its money, not its credit.” Meanwhile, they do it anyway from a profit motive, even though it flies in the face of their primary duty to protect people’s money.
In Howard & Foster Co. vs. Citizens National Bank of Union, 133 S.C.202; 130 SE 758, (1927), it was stated, “It has been settled beyond controversy that a national bank, under Federal law, being limited in it’s power and capacity, cannot lend it’s credit by guaranteeing the debt of another. All such contracts being entered into by its officers are ultra vires and not binding upon the corporation.” An activity constitutes an incidental power if it is closely related to an express power and is useful in carrying out the business of banking.

First Nat. Bank of Eastern Arkansas v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775. But even with this latitude no hint of lending credit is provided in 12 U.S.C. 24 that would give rise to an incidental power to lend credit. The exercise of powers not expressly granted to national banks is prohibited: First National Bank v. National Exchange Bank 29 U.S. 122, 128, California Bank v. Kennedy 167 U.S. 362, 367, Concord Bank v. Hawkins 174 U.S. 364. Further, it is laid down as a general rule that a national bank cannot lend its credit by becoming surety, indorser, or guarantor for another. “In the federal courts, it is well settled that a national bank has not power to lend its credit to another by becoming surety, indorser, or guarantor for him.” cases: C.E. Healey & Son v. Stewardson Nat. Bank, 1 N.E.2d 858, 285 Ill. App. 290.People’s Nat. Bank of Winston-Salem vs. Southern States Finance Co., 122 S.E. 415, 192 N.C. 69, 48 A.L.R. 519.Colley v. Chowchilla Nat. Bank, 255 P. 188, 200 C. 760, 52 A.L.R. 569.Rice & Hutchins Atlanta Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Macon, 88 S.E. 999, 18 Ga.App. 151.First Nat.Bank of Hagerman v. Stringfield, 235 P. 897, 40 Ill.App. 376City Nat. Bank of Wellington v. Morgan, Civ. App., 258 S.W. 572.Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank of Reedsville v. Kingwood Nat. Bank, 101 S.E. 734, 85 W.Va. 371.Best v. State Bank of Bruce, 221 N.W. 379, 197 Wis. 20.
A National bank’s charter requires that they protect customer’s money first, and make money second. National banks are only allowed to make money in order to protect people’s money so one serves the other, but the priority is to protect. In Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman, 139 U.S. 60, 11 S. Ct. 478, 35 L. Ed. 55, the court said: “A contract ultra vires being unlawful and void, not because it is in itself immoral, but because the corporation, by the law of its creation, is incapable of making it, the courts, while refusing to maintain any action upon the unlawful contract, have always striven to do justice between the parties, so far as could be done consistently with adherence to law, by permitting a property or money, parted with on the faith of the unlawful contract, to be recovered back, or compensation to be made for it. In such case, however, the action is not maintained upon the unlawful contract, nor according to its terms; but on an implied contract of the defendant to return, or failing to do that, to make compensation for, property or money which it has no right to retain. To maintain such an action is not to affirm, but to disaffirm, the unlawful contract.” a. “When a contract is once declared ultra vires, the fact that it is executed does not validate it, nor can it be ratified, so as to make it the basis of suitor action, nor does the doctrine of estoppel apply.” Fand PR v. Richmond b. “A national bank cannot lend its credit to another by becoming surety, endorser, or guarantor for him, such an act; is ultra vires…” Merchants Bank v. Baird 160 F 642. “In the federal courts, it is well established that a National bank has no power to lend its credit to another by becoming surety, indorser, or guarantor for him.” Farmers and Miners Bank v. Bluefield Nat’l Bank, 11 F 2d 83, 271 U.S.669.
“Mr. Justice Marshall said: The doctrine of ultra vires is a most powerful weapon to keep private corporations within their legitimate spheres and to punish them for violations of their corporate charters, and it probably is not invoked too often. Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National Bank, 103 Wis 125, 79 NW 229. American Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 194 NW 430.
“A bank may not lend its credit to another even though such a transaction turns out to have been a benefit to the bank, and in support of this a list of cases might be cited, which-would like a catalog of ships.” [Emphasis added] Norton Grocery Co. v. Peoples Nat. Bank, 144 SE 505. 151 Va 195.“It has been settled beyond controversy that a national bank, under federal Law being limited in its powers and capacity, cannot lend its credit by guaranteeing the debts of another. All such contracts entered into by its officers are ultra vires…” Howard and Foster Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of Union, 133 SC 202, 130 SE 759 (1926). “…checks, drafts, money orders, and bank notes are not lawful money of the United States…” State v. Neilon, 73 Pac 324, 43 Ore 168. “Neither, as included in its power not incidental to them, it is a part of a bank’s business to lend it’s credit. If a bank could lend its credit as well as its money, it might, if it received compensation and was careful to put its name only to solid paper, make a great deal more than any lawful interest on its money would amount to. If not careful, the power would be the mother of panics. Indeed, lending credit is the exact opposite of lending money which is the real business of a bank, for while the latter creates a liability in favor of the bank, the former gives rise to a liability of the bank to another. Morse. Banks and Banking 5th Ed. Sec. 65; Magee, Banks and Banking, 3rd Ed. Sec 248.” American Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 194 NW 429.
“It is not within those statutory powers for a national bank, even though solvent, to lend its credit to another in any of the various ways in which that might be done.” Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. L “Herrison, 33 F 2d 841, 842 (1929). “There is no doubt but what the law is that national bank cannot lend its credit or become an accommodation endorser.” National Bank of Commerce v. Atkinson, 55 E 471. “…the bank is allowed to hold money upon personal security; but it must be money that it loans, not its credit.” Seligman v. Charlottesville Nat. Bank, 3 Hughes 647, Fed Case No. 12, 642, 1039. “A loan may be defined as the delivery by one party to, and receipt by another party of, a sum of money upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum with or without interest.” Parsons v. Fox 179 Ga 605, 176 SE 644. Also see Kirkland v. Bailey, 155 SE 2d 701 and United States v. Neifert White Co., 247 Fed Supp 878, 879.
“The word ‘money’ in its usual and ordinary acceptation means gold, silver, or paper money used as a circulating medium of exchange…” Lane v. Railey 280 Ky 319, 133 SW 2d 75 “A promise to pay cannot, by argument, however ingenious, be made the equivalent of actual payment..” Christensen v. Beebe, 91 P 133, 32 Utah 406. “A bank is not the holder in due course upon merely crediting the depositors account.” Bankers Trust v. Nagler, 229 NYS 2d 142, 143.

Any false representation of material facts made with knowledge of falsity and with intent that it shall be acted on by another in entering into contract, and which is so acted upon, constitutes ‘fraud,’ and entitles party deceived to avoid contract or recover damages.” Barnsdall Refining Corn, v. Birnam Wood Oil Co., 92 F 26 817.
“Any conduct capable of being turned into a statement of fact is representation. There is no distinction between misrepresentations effected by words and misrepresentations effected by other acts.” Leonard v. Springer 197 Ill 532.64 NE 301. “If any part of the consideration for a promise be illegal, or if there are several considerations for an unseverable promise, one of which is illegal, the promise, whether written or oral, is wholly void, as it is impossible to say what part or which one of the considerations induced the promise.” Menominee River Co. v. Augustus Spies L and C Co., 147 Wis 559.572; 132 NW 1122.

The contract is void if it is only in part connected with the illegal transaction and promise single or entire.” Guardian Agency v. Guardian Mut. Savings Bank, 227 Wis 550, 279 NW 83.

“It is not necessary for recession of a contract that the party making the misrepresentation should have known that it was false, but recovery is allowed even though misrepresentation is innocently made, because it would be unjust to allow one who made false representations, even innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by such representations.” Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis 2d 166.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Turner, 869 F. 2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989)“Turner was told that the blank for the debtor’s name would be completed by adding the name of a company affiliated with Turner. Unknown to Turner, the guarantee was completed by filling in the name of a debtor with whom Turner was not affiliated and by altering the guarantee to change the name of the bank/creditor. The court held that Turner could assert a fraud claim against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as owner of the note in its corporate capacity.” Southern Mortgage Company v. O’Dom, 699 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D. Miss. 1988 “The court held that the fraud claim was defective since it alleged a promise to perform an act in the future or a representation as to future events…The court rejected this claim holding that there was no evidence that the lender had any sort of power or domination over the borrower who was free to seek financing elsewhere.”
American National Bank & Trust Company v. Hanson Construction Co., Inc., 1991 WL 42668 (Ky. 1991) “The court held that, considering the relationship of the parties, Hanson was reasonable in relying upon the alleged representations by the bank. The court held that the future financing provisions were not so indefinite that it would be unreasonable for Hanson to rely upon them. Hanson’s failure to read the loan documents was excusable since he was encouraged by the bank officer not to read them and bank officer advised him not to have his lawyer present at the closing. The court affirmed a jury award of compensatory and punitive damages against the bank.”

Nibbi Brothers. Inc. v. Brannen Street Both national and international investors, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1415 (1988)“The court acknowledged that the statute would not bar a claim for unjust enrichment if it could be shown that a benefit had been conferred on the lender by mistake, fraud, coercion or request. Thus, had Home induced Nibbi to provide work on the project under circumstances in which Home’s inducement fell under circumstances traditional categories of mistake, fraud, coercion or request, a claim for unjust enrichment might escape the reach of the statutory bar.” Bank of Sun Prairie v. Esser, 151 Wis.2d 11, 442 N.W.2d 540 (1989)
“The court affirmed the jury verdict in favor of Esser for fraud based upon evidence that at the closing the bank advised Esser that she was signing only for the new truck loan. The court held that Esser’s reliance on the bank’s misrepresentations was reasonable since she trusted the bank’s security practices and believed that the guarantee only applied to the new loan. The court also held that the trial court should have submitted Esser’s punitive damage claim to the jury because of evidence that the bank’s misrepresentation was active and bank took advantage of Esser’s trust and reliance.” Touche Ross Limited v. Filipek, 778 P.2d 721 (Haw. 1989)“the court held that the alleged misrepresentations made by the bank were material and actionable since it was claimed that the bank affiliate did not have the development expertise it was represented to have and had no intention of advancing the funds when the promise was made.”

Blankenheim v. E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 1463 (1990) “The court held that a claim of negligent misrepresentation is included within the definition of “fraud” as used in the statute and as that term is defined in Civil Code § 1572. The court also held that questions of fact were presented as to whether the both national and international investors had justifiably relied upon Hutton’s alleged representations concerning the investment. First National Bank of Montgomery vs. Jerome Daly. “Regarding the power to delegate the control of our money supply to a private corporation can be found in 16 Am Jur 2d, Section 347, which states: “The rule has become fixed that the legislature may not delegate legislative functions to private persons or groups, or to private corporations or a group of private corporations.”
“Banking Associations from the very nature of their business are prohibited from lending credit.” (St. Louis Savings Bank vs. Parmalee 95 U. S. 557) “Banking corporations cannot lend credit.” (First National Bank of Amarillo vs. Slaton Independent School District, Tex Civ App 1933, 58 SW 2d 870)
“Nowhere is the express authority granted to the corporation to lend its credit.” (Gardilner Trust vs. Augusta Trust, 134 Me 191; 291 US 245)
“A national bank has no authority to lend its credit.” (Johnston vs. Charlottesville National Bank, C.C. Va. 1879, Fed Cas. 7425)

“A contract made by a corporation beyond the scope of corporate powers is unlawful and void.” (McCormick vs. Market National Bank, 165 U.S. 5 In Federal District Court, the borrower may have additional claims for relief under “Civil RICO”In Federal District Court, the borrower may have additional claims for relief under “Civil RICO” Federal Racketeering laws. (18 U.S.C. 1964) As the lender may have. In a Debtor’s RICO action against its creditor, alleging that the creditor had collected an unlawful debt, an interest rate (where all loan charges were added together) that exceeded, in the language of the RICO Statute, “twice the enforceable rate.” The Court found no reason to impose a requirement that the Plaintiff show the Defendant had been convicted of collecting an unlawful debt, running a “loan sharking” operation. The debt included the fact that exaction of a usurious interest rate rendered the debt unlawful and that is all that is necessary to support the Civil RICO action. Durante Bros. And Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat’l Bank, 755 F2d 239, Cert. Denied, 473 US 906 (1985).25. The Supreme Court found that the Plaintiff in a civil RICO action need establish only a criminal “violation” and not a criminal conviction. Further, the court held that the Defendant need only have caused harm to the Plaintiff by the commission of a predicate offense in such a way as to constitute a “pattern of Racketeering activity.” That is, the Plaintiff need not demonstrate that the Defendant is an organized crime figure, a mobster in the popular sense, or that the Plaintiff has suffered some type of special Racketeering injury; all that the Plaintiff must show is what the Statute specifically requires. The RICO Statute and civil remedies for its violation are to be liberally construed to effect the congressional purpose as broadly formulated in the Statute. Sedima, SPRL v. Imrex Co., 473 US 479 (1985).

The counter complaints will be filed and these administrative proceedings are instituted under the Members of “WE THE PEOPLE” Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq. and Title 12 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 226, regulation Z and X.

The Federal Reserve Board Interpretation, Title 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 226, Supplement I, Paragraph 23(a)(1), provides that in such a situation the transaction is rescindable. Since the VISTA non-disclosures was made in relation to the members of “WE THE PEOPLE” credit transaction were not presented in the manner required by law all of which are void ab initio.

Core collateral cases will be brought forth for individual recovery, punitive and penal damages to which experts in their field will be giving testimony, declarations, and breakdowns of the embedded contracts for procedural recommendations for individual audit of malfeasants’ recommendations to the Internal Revenue Service for proper taxation recovery from the players involved in these crimes against humanity of 100% tax liability for FAILURE to provide the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with any report of examination or related information identifying possible tax law noncompliance.

Respectfully submitted

X_____________________
See UCC 1-308

The League of Fraudulently Dispossessed Homeowners

Court of PUBLICLY held opinion’s

ATTESTATIONS OF TRUTH “WE ARE ONE” NATION “UNDER GOD” indivisible… Denied Justice UNDER COLOR OF LAW.

NOTIFICATION OF TREASON

It has become clear that we as a Nation we have been under attack.   As one Nation under god we must come together to fight our enemies, both foreign and domestic.   We understand that COVID 19 was never about the virus, and we are watching history unfold.   This update comes after an attack upon the white hat supporters in our group.   A massive illegal foreclosure wave is positioning to hit our Nation.  You who are finding this, are already aware of what has been going down.  We can no longer afford to be ignorant of the colorful laws being miscued.   If you are facing an illegal foreclosure, and held MERS as a beneficiary upon a TITLE DEED, then you hold an instrument of treason against the people of the United State of America.  

Notices to each state have been given via social media of Governors positioning over 20 Million foreclosures to be “captured” by the State.  You were NOT GRANTED authority to do so, and will be brought before tribunals should you engage.   

This is a quick background: 

In 1999 Sen. Joe Biden (D-Del.) voted with 89 others to repeal the Glass-Steagall’s regulations  including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer (D-Md.), House Minority Leader John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) and Minority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.)  

By the removal of certain provisions within Glass-Steagall’s, it allowed NA banks such as UBS and Deutschebank Securities to not only swap around and underwrite their own securities, but by allowing unlimited access of NA Member banks using MERS MIN (Member Identification Number) to breach PUBLIC TRUST/s/.

The PUBLIC were never told (@SCOTUS) that “ALL officers of the Court are Directors, Collectors, or Representatives of the IRS for such TRUSTING SUBJECT MATTERS . See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81(f)… state “Courts” are NOT acting with the “GOVERNMENT” for civilian protection.   

Pertaining to the U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1,3,5,6,18… “MATTERS of national security cannot tolerate any blind spots” when did it become permissible to allow a NA BANKING MEMBER “BORROWER” to influence congress so far beyond these provisional scopes as to pass such laws for the credit the US to be hypothecated by utilizing citizens as congressional co-signers in congress stead (cl.2)?  See Nos. 19-715, 19-760.  Let this sink in here… 

States that are acting as custodians for their PEOPLE as a MORT GAGE have been enabling it’s citizens to act as co-signers for the Constitutional role of Congress as implied members thereto, for an undisclosed NA T.U.MERS BORROWER who trademarked PEOPLE in the NAME of the UNITED STATES “systematically” targeted by race, class and tier.  (Further elaborated within upon the implementation of a “Spiritual” Empty Death Gage used for a tax evasion scheme to the lower Classes through conditioning). 

These “Other than Ordinary” 1099-A Income reportings, fall under Sec. 7231 for failure to obtain license for the collection of foreign items §6901 27 Part 70. Further, registrations under 27 USC §7011 Parts 19, 22, 25, 70, 194, 270, 285, 290 and 26 CFR Parallel Authorities, mean under Sec. 7025 Part 197 these congressional enabled “revenue laws” are actually defined as “STATE” commercial crimes under the IRS Codes against the UNITED STATES.  See The Beatitude

For “IRS” clarity: This case was submitted to the Federal Court of Claims on behalf of the PEOPLE for failure to comply with the recording requirements pursuant to Title 24 Part 27 Delegation Order, missing as required by Treasury Regulation 1.856-6 et seq. further failing to comply under IRC 26 US Code Sec §1250 and §1245 Recapture Rules and Disallowance of an undisclosed BORROWER using INDIVIDUALS as pledged congressional cosigning COLLATERAL partners.  In part, these SUBJECT MATTERS fell under Regulation X, (REG-136676-13) and were NOT subject to judicial modification.   . For clarity: State courts could not hold jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any ill-conceived Act of Congress relating to patents, trademarks or copyrights, meaning that states could not foreclosure without either Treasury authorization, or orders from the acting POTUS under the war powers act.  See 28 U.S. Code § 1338… trademarks, and unfair competition (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademark.

Though the law is quite clear in these “SUBJECT” matters, violation of the PEOPLE/s/ unalienable rights breached the equal protection laws guaranteed by the Constitution on a Nationwide scale. 

This a a 10b5 enjoinder for the people, by the people for the protection of the people against BAR litigants attempting to steal YOUR property.

IRS id theft counter claims copy 2

Citizen_Complaint Master 2

Violation-of-rights-under-color-of-law

ACCOUNTING SANCTIONS AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

mers-nationsbank-security-agreement—assignment-tm-1773-0949(3)

IRS_ID_Theft_Affidavit

95a MASTER

TCR_Master

Form – US Postal Mail Fraud Report – FILL-IN copy

These forms are to be fill out against the bad actors conducting illegal foreclosures.

f211 copy

This form is a summary report for the Treasury to go after sanctions.

SF24-16d copy 2

This is an audit you can compare your title to..

Brashear CW pay option refi 5-14-2007

Evidence Codes

Evidence Code

28 U.S.C. 902 – Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating

Rule 902. Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating | Federal Rules

The Supreme court will need to Explain in detail how the FRIEND ENTRY giving Military Notice of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to the Federal Claims Court, authorizing that court to act under Common Law is not obstruction of Article III Tribunals under Section 3 -Treason to take it upon themselves to dismiss this case.

Note: The people to whom these brave whistleblowers are exposing, have been declared guilty of treason against the United States of America, and thusly are posted here for Article III Tribunals in that Federal Marshals can begin their arrests.

Federal Claims Cover
Federal Claim Narative Cover attachment
Federal Claim
AMICUS CURIAE 1
Federal Claim – Memorandum
private AG
Co-Qui Tams
Objection 1
Filed 9th District Error Correction

Main Exhibit showing the Trademark Underwritten Mortgage Electronic Registration System aka (TUMERS) was the ALL CAP BORROWER upon your Deed of Trust! There are over 500 pass through fake securities created through TUMERS which turned you into a MEMBER BANK to BORROW against your signature as credit. Than Deed of Trust you think was a mortgage, was a government election of action upon a commercial purchase and sale lease back revamped upon an IRS form separated by state. There were never any “Mortgages” only POST(al) MORT(um)GAGES.
MERS NATIONSBANK SECURITY AGREEMENT – assignment-tm-1773-0949
Approved Trustee List

Testimony of Whistleblower – (TU)MERS fabricated The Title Chains
TU-MERS Declaration of Wyler & Powers for Congress/FBI/SEC/DOJ Investigations

TUMERS AUDITS they do not want you to see, tied right to the WELLS FARGO Foreclosure manual
MERS 1

MERS 2

MERS 3

MERS 4

Exhibit 7- foreclosure_attorney_procedure_manual-by Master Servicer of Deutsch Trust – Wells Fargo

(Administrative back door “IMPLIED” VISTA process requested for seal – ya know because this is the “BOND-age” right?)

Welcome to the home page of the League of Fraudulently Dispossessed Homeowners. Within this site are the seeds of change. It is time that the truth behind the Dirty Deeds otherwise known as the Federalized Banking Industry be revealed. The symbol to your left indicated our intent to audit the books of corporate America for the aiding and abetting of embezzlement of your estate via the use of your signature upon contracts which held no mortgages.

Within these pages you will learn exactly what was done to us, to our lands, and to our beloved people across this nation. What you will learn in these pages, is how you were used in the worlds largest tax evasion scheme in the history of mankind. Enabled by Congress, implemented in 1999, glitched in 2015, and now brought to you by the people, for the people. Herein lies the truth..

This site contains disturbing photos, restricted information, and sickening truths – enter of your own free will. No we are not a Government Agency – we just behave like one… not our fault ya gave us a loophole..

DISCLOSURES – Brought to you by FIOA

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The information about Foreclosure law and other legal information provided on this website does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice; instead, all information, content, and materials available on this site are for general informational purposes only.  Information on this website may not constitute the most up-to-date legal or other information.  This website contains links to other third-party websites.  Such links are only for the convenience of the reader, user or browser; FRAUD STOPPERS and its members do not recommend or endorse the contents of the third-party sites.

Readers of this website should contact their attorney to obtain advice with respect to any particular legal matter.  No reader, user, or browser of this site should act or refrain from acting on the basis of information on this site without first seeking legal advice from counsel in the relevant jurisdiction.  Only your individual attorney can provide assurances that the information contained herein – and your interpretation of it – is applicable or appropriate to your particular situation.  Use of, and access to, this website or any of the links or resources contained within the site do not create an attorney-client relationship between the reader, user, or browser and website authors, contributors, contributing law firms, or committee members and their respective employers. This site provides “information” about the law and is only designed to help users safely cope with their own legal needs. But legal information is not the same as legal advice — the application of law to an individual’s specific circumstances.

The views expressed at, or through, this site are those of the individual authors writing in their individual capacities only – not those of their respective employers, FRAUD STOPPERS, or committee/task force as a whole.  All liability with respect to actions taken or not taken based on the contents of this site are hereby expressly disclaimed.  The content on this posting is provided “as is;” no representations are made that the content is error-free.

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